Researchers Show how to steal an election with Diebold

Of course you already knew they could do this right? I mean I think that's the whole point of Diebold "no-paper trail machine" right?















Princeton researchers show how to steal an election with Diebold machines
Princeton security researchers Ariel J. Feldman, J. Alex Halderman, and Edward W. Felten have taken apart one of Diebold's notorious voting machines and done a thorough security analysis of its workings. They showed that they could easily install software on the machine that would allow an attacker to steal votes from one candidate and give them to another -- they showed that this would be undetectable, and easily done. They've published a paper and an amazing, disturbing video showing how this could be done
...
Diebold insists that their machines are secure, and that they don't need voter-verified paper audit-tapes that keep a real-time log of the votes cast -- but this latest attack, which requires only a few minutes to execute, shows that America's votes should not be run on Diebold hardware.
More:
Online Policy Group v. Diebold, Inc.
Princeton University Center for Information Technology
Linked at BoingBoing